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This article focuses on the concept of aisthetics, which was proposed 
by Wolfgang Welsh as an extended understanding of aesthetics as a 
study of sensory perception. This has recently been a topic of interest 
amongst Japanese aestheticians under the heading of kanseigaku [感
性学 ]. This article contextualises the growing acceptance of 
aisthetics in Japan with a historical analysis of the development of 
the term ‘kansei’ (aisthesis) over the course of a century, and further 
by examining the problem of translation between European and 
Japanese aesthetic terminologies. Thus it is important to re-consider 
the concept of ‘the aesthetic’ from a perspective of aisthetics. 
Subsequently, the actual method of aisthetics is discussed through an 
examination of a recent theorisation of kanseigaku proposed by 
Eisuke Tsugami. His kanseigaku provides a method to describe 
aesthetic experience, which is independent of the European concepts 
of beauty or art. Furthermore, Tsugami’s methodology illuminates 
affinity and differences between his kanseigaku and Alexander 
Gottlieb Baumgarten’s ‘science of sensory perception’. Through 
characterising Baumgarten’s aesthetics in the context of the 
traditional dichotomy between aisthesis and noesis in Europe and 
that of the rationalistic conceptualisation of perception, this article 
provides a basic denominator for comparison between European and 
non-European cultural or philosophical discourses as a tool to initiate 
comparative aisthetics. Ultimately, the scope of aisthetics is broader 
than what a philosophy of art or beauty can cover. Thus it has the 
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Introduction 
In 1991 and 1992, Kyoto University conducted an aesthetic research project 
entitled “The Possibility and Genealogy of Aesthetics as the Science of 
Sensitive Cognition.”1 “The science of sensitive cognition” (kanseiteki ninshiki 
no gaku) is a common translation of the Latin “scientia cognitionis sensitivae,” 
which was employed as a definition of aesthetics by Alexander Gottlieb 
Baumgarten.2 By introducing the concept ‘kansei’ (sensibility) as a central 
topic of research, Kyoto University’s project posited aesthetics as the 
exploration of knowledge derived from human experience, and the nature of 
such knowledge. 3  In current Japanese terminology, this new stream of 
aesthetics focusing on ‘kansei’ is called ‘kanseigaku’: a combination of the two 
nouns ‘kansei’ and ‘study’ (-gaku). 4  In 2000, the Japanese Society of 
Aesthetics held a symposium to review the traditional concept of aesthetics and 
open a new understanding of aesthetics for the twenty first century. ‘Kansei’ 
was again brought to the fore as the main topic.5 The first controversy that 
                                                
1 The Japanese title of the research project is “‘Kanseiteki ninshiki no gaku’ to 
shiteno Asthetik no kanōsei to sono keifu.” See: “The Possibility and Genealogy of 
Aesthetics as the Science of Sensitive Cognition,” Database of Grants-in-Aid for 
Scientific Research, accessed April 29, 2012, http://kaken.nii.ac.jp/en/p/03301008. 
Given in their official translation, the adjective ‘kanseiteki’ is translated as 
‘sensitive’, thus the noun ‘kansei’ should be translated into English as ‘sensitivity’. 
Nevertheless, I use ‘sensibility’ in order to avoid confusion between the terms 
‘kansei’ and ‘kanjusei’, which is the common translation of the English word 
‘sensitivity’. Because the word ‘kanjusei 感受性’ includes ‘ju受’: derivative of the 
verb ‘ukeru 受ける’ (receive), this term emphasises a passive and receptive quality 
of sensitivity. Nevertheless, the concept of “sensitive cognition” envisaged by the 
researchers expresses an active and dynamic quality of sensory perception. In order 
to include those qualities, ‘kansei’ (and therefore its common English translation 
‘sensibility’) is more appropriate than ‘sensitivity’. The translation ‘sensibility’ is 
also subject to doubt, and the new translation ‘aisthesis’ was subsequently adopted 
– the process of which will be examined in this article. 
2 Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, Aesthetica (Frankfurt: I.C. Kleyb, 1750). 
3  “The Possibility and Genealogy of Aesthetics as the Science of Sensitive 
Cognition.” 
4 ‘Gaku 学’ is commonly used in Japanese as a suffix – that is, a radical or a root 
word applied to many branches of knowledge.  
5 Kyoto City University of Arts, Research Group of Aesthetic and Cultural Theory, 
ed., Kanseigaku, nijūisseiki no bigaku ni mukete [Aisthesis – Towards 21st Century 
Aesthetics] (Kyoto: Gyōji Sha, 2001), 127-234. [English translation of book titles 
supplied by Tomoe Nakamura]. 
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arose in this symposium was the validation of the current translation of ‘kansei’ 
into foreign languages.6 In English, ‘kansei’ is usually translated as ‘sensibility’ 
but doubt was cast on this translation. ‘Kansei’ is ‘sensibility’ in that both of 
the words signify a capacity to respond to sensory stimuli in the widest sense. 
In English, however, ‘sensibility’ can mean a capacity for higher or more 
refined feelings, or a temperament which experiences emotion intensely.7 
These connotations do not exist in the Japanese concept of ‘kansei’. A similar 
problem arises from the German translation of ‘kansei’ as a philosophical use 
of the term ‘Sinnlichkeit’ (sensibility). This word derives from Kantian 
terminology and does not exactly reflect ‘kansei’, as I will discuss later in this 
article.  
One attempt to resolve the problem of translation was adopted in the 
proceedings of this symposium, published in the following year.8 ‘Kansei’ was 
translated not as ‘sensibility’ or ‘Sinnlichkeit’ but as ‘aisthesis’ (sensory 
perception).9 This translation was inspired by the contemporary philosopher 
Wolfgang Welsch.10 In his book Aisthesis, Welsch explores a new potential for 
aesthetics through an examination of the Aristotelian concept of ‘aisthesis’ 
(αίσθησις), which signifies the highest form of ‘practical wisdom’ (φρόνησις, 
phronésis) in ‘a practical mind’ (νους, nous).11 Based on the claim that ‘the 
sensible’ (Sinnenhafte) increases in importance, Welsch argues that a re-
evaluation of Aristotle is necessary because from the time of Plato onward, 
Aristotle was the only philosopher who denied the philosophical condemnation 
of sensibility and posited instead the concept of ‘aisthesis’ as a legitimate 
subject for philosophical inquiry and its relevance for both theory and 
                                                
6 Kyoto City University of Arts, Kanseigaku, 131-134. 
7 For example, Jane Austin’s Sense and Sensibility (1811) provides a clear contrast 
between the concept of ‘sense’ and ‘sensibility’ in this context.  
8 Kyoto City University of Arts, Kanseigaku. This book consists of a transcript of 
the symposium, and essays written by the attendees of the symposium. 
9 Although the Greek word aisthesis is usually translated as ‘perception’, I use 
‘sensory awareness’ in order to emphasise both the sensory aspect of perception 
and its relationship to knowledge. This translation is based upon the works of 
Wolfgang Welsch, who defined the Greek word class aisthesis as expressions that 
designate sensation and perception combined together. See Wolfgang Welsch, 
“Aesthetics Beyond Aesthetics,” in Practical Aesthetics in Practice and Theory, 
ed. Martti Honkanen (Helsinki: University of Helsinki, 1997), 18.  
10 Kyoto City University of Arts, Kanseigaku, 235-238. The introductory chapter of 
Welsch’s Aisthesis was included in this book. 
11 Wolfgang Welsch, Aisthesis: Grundzüge und Perspektiven der Aristotelischen 
Sinneslehre (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1987), 20-21. 
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practice.12 The attention paid to Welsch and the concept of ‘aisthesis’ marked 
an attempt to expand a Japanese term, ‘kansei’, into a more internationally 
comprehensible philosophical concept and to compare and contrast it with 
terms of sensory perception in other philosophical traditions.  
Recently, aesthetics viewed from a perspective of ‘aisthesis’ has been 
called ‘aisthetics’.13 In this article, my English translation of ‘kansei’ and 
‘kanseigaku’ borrows this phrase ‘aisthetics’ in consideration of the connection 
between Welsch’s attention to ‘aisthesis’ and the interest in ‘kansei’ in Japan. 
During the last decade, Kansei-gaku, or aisthetics, rapidly permeated Japanese 
academia. It is now possible to say that the concept of aesthetics in a wide 
sense has been understood in Japanese society mainly through three 
perspectives: aesthetics in a narrow sense as a study of aesthetic properties 
such as beauty (bi-gaku美学), ‘artistics’ – a study of art (geijutsu-gaku 藝術
学 ), and aisthetics as a study of aisthesis (kansei-gaku 感性学 ). 14  The 




Three Perspectives of Aesthetics in Japanese Society 
                                                
12 Welsch, Aisthesis, 19-26. 
13 Birgit M. Kaiser, “On Aesthetics, Aisthetics and Sensation – reading Baumgarten 
with Leibniz with Deleuze,” Estheticatijdschrift (2011), accessed April 9, 2012, 
http://www.estheticatijdschrift.nl/magazine/2011/artikelen/aesthetics 
-aisthetics-and-sensation-%E2%80%93-reading-baumgarten-leibniz-deleuze. 
14 The word ‘artistics’ is also based upon the works of Welsch. He defined 
‘artistics’ as “an explication of art with particular attention to beauty.” See: 
Welsch, “Aesthetics Beyond Aesthetics,” 18. 
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The development of kanseigaku seen in the Kyoto University research 
project of 1990s and the Japanese Society of Aesthetics conference in 2000 
suggests that the concept of ‘kansei’ was thought to be a significant and 
necessary topic for contemporary aesthetics in Japanese society. There seem to 
be two different, but connected, reasons for the adoption of aisthetics in Japan. 
One is related to the historical background of the word ‘kansei’ and the other is 
related to the difficulty in translating ‘aesthetics’ into Japanese discourses. 
Below is an attempt to elucidate these two reasons. Furthermore, through 
clarification of the relationship between the recent development of aisthetics in 
Japan and Baumgarten’s aesthetics, this article suggests that re-consideration of 
aesthetics from a perspective of aisthetics contributes to the study of 
comparative aesthetics. To illuminate the scope and potential of this 
perspective is the main purpose of this article.  
 
An Historical Reason for the Growing Acceptance of Kanseigaku  
The word ‘kansei’ does not have a long history in Japan. In 1875, ‘kansei’ was 
employed in the first volume of Nishi Amane’s translation of The Mental 
Philosophy written by American psychologist, Joseph Haven. 15  Haven 
differentiated his mental philosophy from metaphysics and posited it as a 
psychology among the natural sciences, that is, a science that rests on 
experimental observations and induction.16 Hence the term ‘kansei’ began as 
technical terminology in the area of natural sciences. Nishi’s translation project 
was a reflection of the requirement of the time that Japan should open its door 
to foreign countries after more than two hundred years of national seclusion.17 
There was an increasingly prevalent view in the late nineteenth century that 
Japan needed to catch up with European and American modernisation as 
quickly as possible. The philosopher Nishi was a member of the diplomatic 
missions sent to Europe, and later took on the task of introducing so-called 
Western academic disciplines into the country. In terms of philosophy and 
psychology, Nishi believed that it was necessary to coin new Japanese terms 
                                                
15 Yoshiteru Asō, Kinsei Nihon Tetsugaku Shi [The History of Modern Japanese 
Philosophy] (Tokyo: Kondō Shoten, 1942), 310-312. 
16 For the definition of Haven’s mental philosophy, see Joseph Haven, Mental 
Philosophy: Including the Intellect, Sensibilities and Will (Boston: Gould and 
Lincoln, 1857), 15-16. 
17 The history of the development of aesthetics and philosophy in the Meiji era is 
explored in further detail in both Tetsuhiro Katō, Meijikinihon no Bigaku to 
Geijutsu Kenkyū [Aesthetics and Art Studies in Modern Japan] (Kyoto: Kyōwa 
Insatsu, 2002) as well as Asō, Tetsugaku Shi. 
Tomoe Nakamura 
 
Aesthetics 23 (1) June 2013, page 140 
 
because the conceptualisations of ‘mind’ in Western thought were more diverse 
than Chinese or Confucian ideas and their vocabularies did not share similar 
connotations with any existing Japanese word.18 Nishi’s translation of Haven’s 
concept of ‘sensibility’—‘kansei’—was one of his creations. In Haven’s 
psychology, the concept of ‘sensibility’ was distinguished from that of intellect 
and will, and was understood as the mind’s capacity for psychological feeling 
or emotion, not mere physical sensation.19 Although Nishi did not directly 
explain the process of the translation of the term ‘sensibility’, his sketchy notes 
show that he looked for Chinese characters that corresponded to the Haven’s 
trichotomy: intellect, will, and sensibility. The outcome, ‘kansei 感性’, was a 
combination of two Chinese characters: ‘kan 感’ (feel) and ‘sei 性’ (natural 
quality). Essentially, this combination matched Haven’s concept of 
‘sensibility’, which signified a capacity for psychological feeling. In 1881, the 
first Japanese dictionary of philosophy was published and the word ‘kansei’ 
was included as a translation of the English term ‘sensibility’.20  
Soon the word ‘kansei’ was applied as a concept that was used in 
metaphysics and transcendental philosophy when German philosophy joined 
the mainstream of philosophical research in Japan. 21  It was used as a 
translation of the Kantian term ‘Sinnlichkeit’, which is translated into English 
also as ‘sensibility’.22 Kantian ‘Sinnlichkeit’ signifies a receptive and non-
conceptual capacity.23 Sensibility itself has no ability to construct a concept. It 
                                                
18 Nishi Amane, “Shinrigaku (1878-9),” [Psychology] in Nishi Amane Zenshu 
[Complete Works of Nishi Amane] vol 1., ed. Toshiaki Ōkubo (Tokyo: Munetaka 
Shobō, 1970), 8-9. See also: Asō, Tetsugaku Shi, 312. 
19 Haven, Mental Philosophy, 377-378. 
20 Shūichi Ueda, “Kansei Kīwādo no Hatten to Sono Genkai,” [The Evolution and 
the Development of “Kansei” Keywords] Library and Information Science 41 
(1999): 18. See also: Asō, Tetsugaku Shi, 317. 
21 According to Asō, the lecture on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason given by 
Michael Cooper at Tokyo University triggered an earnest investigation into Kantian 
philosophy post-1878. The interest in Kant, German idealism, and the 
Enlightenment became intense as a result of the rapid industrialisation of Japan, the 
establishment of the Diet, a rise of democracy, and the introduction of Prussian 
despotism. See: Asō, Tetsugaku Shi, 69. 
22 Izuru Shinmura ed., Kōjien [Wide Garden of Words] (Tokyo: Iwanami-Shoten, 
1955) 476. 
23 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London: 
Redwood Press, 1973), 65: “The capacity for receiving representations through the 
mode in which we are affected by objects, is entitled sensibility. Objects are given 
to us by means of sensibility, and it alone yields us intuitions; they are thought 
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simply allows a response. The combination of an active function of 
‘understanding’ (Verstand) and a receptive function of ‘sensibility’ 
(Sinnlichkeit) is necessary to establish cognition as ‘knowledge’ (Erkenntnis).24 
Consequently the original meaning of kansei entailed two meanings of the term 
‘sensibility’: first the term as used in nineteenth century American psychology, 
and secondly as used in Kantian and post-Kantian epistemology. In the Meiji 
era, aesthetics was particularly influenced by German Idealism so the meaning 
of ‘sensibility’ was generally understood in the Kantian sense. The word 
‘kansei’ was widely accepted in intellectual life, but not adopted into common 
usage in Japanese society. 
This situation changed suddenly in the 1970s. The word ‘kansei’ entered 
the vernacular in the context of high economic growth. In the early 1980s, 
market research reported a new type of consumption motivated by desire for 
self-actualisation and self-expression. This desire was titled ‘kansei yokkyu’ 
(desire driven by kansei).25 Not long after, the notion of ‘consumption based on 
kansei’ was introduced in contraposition to ‘consumption based on rationality’. 
In response to this market research, designers and the car industry wanted 
engineers to mount a new marketing strategy utilising the connection between 
designs, individual preferences, and vocabularies (such as ‘casual’, ‘elegant’, 
‘cool’ et cetera). The appearance of the new phrase ‘kansei yokkyu’ illustrates 
how kansei came to mean an active source of personal inclination. It has a 
power to promote individual judgment concerning the appeal of language used 
in marketing. It reflects on multifaceted characteristics of a person and 
synthetically represents a personal taste.  
This expansion of the meaning of kansei separates it from the Kantian 
definition for the following reasons. Firstly, kansei no longer refers to a mere 
passive reception of sensory stimuli. Secondly, kansei is no longer clearly 
independent of intellect or will. The concept of kansei now involves the 
influence of conceptual knowledge or practical reason. Indeed, following 
engineering, education as a branch of academia turned its attention to kansei. 
As a result, from 1994 to 1999, the number of academic treatises whose titles 
included kansei increased nearly six times. Interest in the term from the 
perspective of engineering and education was especially conspicuous. The 
word kansei gained popular currency and nowadays is commonly used in daily 
                                                                                                             
through the understanding, and from the understanding arise concepts.”  
24 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 93: “Without sensibility no object would be 
given to us, without understanding no object would be thought. ... Only through 
their union can knowledge arise.” 
25 Statistical data showing the use of the word kansei in 1970s onward is referenced 
in Ueda, “Kansei Kīwādo no Hatten to Sono Genkai,” 17-25. 
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life. Although contemporary use of the word might seem to be abused, there 
are at least three pragmatic implications here. Firstly, kansei is used not only as 
a receptive but also an active faculty to promote judgment or awareness. 
Secondly, kansei is used as a mirror of individuality and of social groups, as 
well as universality. In this way it is altered from the Kantian definition that 
sensibility represented only a universal quality. Thirdly, kansei is understood to 
be a cultivatable human faculty not just a passive sensory experience, and one 
that is desirable to encourage within the academy. 
In summary, the original meaning of kansei in the context of 
experimental psychology or Kantian philosophy was retained in academic 
society, but its use did not prevail widely. Through a re-configuration of the 
term kansei in the 1970s, it came to mean a conscious manipulation of 
unconscious sensory experience, and the use of the term became widespread in 
society. This application and development of the term required philosophers or 
aestheticians to review the meaning of kansei from a different perspective, not 
only as a mechanical translation of European or American concepts, but also as 
a symbolic concept which reflects how Japanese society has recognised the 
sensory. The term kansei was once again re-examined in academia from a new 
perspective. This is a historical reason why kanseigaku, or aisthetics, has been 
adopted and enjoys widespread use in contemporary Japan.  
  
Aisthetics as a Response to a Problem of Translation 
The second reason for the adoption of aisthetics in Japan lies in its potential to 
offer a new approach in response to the difficulties in translating aesthetics into 
Japanese discourses or vice versa. Although aithetics does not resolve the 
difficulties completely, it may offer a different approach to the problem. 
Writing about European aesthetics in Japanese or writing about ‘Japanese’ 
aesthetics in European languages automatically involves comparative 
aesthetics because this activity confronts the dilemma of the translation of 
terminologies. Traditionally, aesthetics is understood as the philosophy of art 
or aesthetic properties such as beauty. In terms of the philosophy of art, since 
the term ‘Japanese art’ is already common in the vernacular, it seems possible 
to compare it with ‘European art’. Nevertheless, this view is not sufficient for 
comparative aesthetics, because the concept of ‘art’ itself is not as universally 
applicable as one might think. It is a concept deeply rooted in the course of 
Western European philosophical and cultural history. European ‘art’ has its 
genealogical root in the Latin word ‘ars’ (art) and the Ancient Greek word 
‘τεχνη, tekhnē’ (technique), which has long played a central part in art, 
including the movement of anti-technique in both the modern and 
contemporary eras. The Japanese translation of art is ‘gei-jutsu 藝術’.  
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Nishi also considered the issue of the translation of the word ‘art’ and 
coined the term ‘gei-jutsu’ derived from an ancient Chinese text – The Book of 
the Later Han Dynasty.26 Historically, the word ‘gei-jutsu’ meant the mixture 
of ‘jutsu’ (technique) and ‘gei’ (practical skill). Nishi employed it as a 
translation of ‘liberal arts’ as used in European aesthetics. Nishi also translated 
‘fine arts’ as ‘bi-jutsu 美術’, which consists of ‘bi’ (beauty) and ‘jutsu’ 
(technique),  and included the traditional kagura dances, the tanka poetry and 
calligraphy, as well as genres of fine arts in Europe such as painting, sculpture, 
engraving, and architecture.27 Nishi’s translations of the terms ‘liberal arts’ and 
‘fine arts’ were more than a mere conversion of terms. Rather, his translation 
project was an attempt to determine the direction of Japanese reflection on the 
cultural history of pre-Meiji times, and the direction of education in the Meiji 
era. In this sense, it was a political project. Therefore, the application of the 
word geijutsu or bijutsu was intrinsically an act of accommodating Japanese 
cultural discourses in a European system of thought, which was an important 
directive of the new government in the Meiji era. Nowadays, nobody would 
doubt that ‘art’ has existed right throughout Japanese history regardless of the 
existence of the word. What this means, however, is that nothing more than the 
fact that some Japanese phenomena can be appreciated from the European 
perspective of art. With this understanding, the necessary reason for the 
coinage is dismissed. For the sake of detailed comparative aesthetics, the 
disjunction found in translation should be taken into consideration rather than 
ignored, and in order to do so, it is necessary to avoid presupposing ‘art’ to be 
a common denominator of comparative aesthetics. 
The same problem arises in the philosophy of ‘the aesthetic’. If an 
aesthetic property, such as the Japanese translation of beauty—‘bi 美’—is 
taken as a static criterion for comparison, and the significance of disjunction is 
missed when the term is translated. Indeed, it has been stated that the Japanese 
sense of beauty is incomprehensible without understanding a particular kind of 
metaphysics in Japanese philosophical discourses. 28  One of the roles of 
                                                
26 Nishi, “Hyakugaku Renkan (1872),” [Encyclopaedia] in Nishi Amane Zenshu 
vol. 4 (Tokyo: Munetaka Shobō, 1981), 23-294. Also, in terms of the origin of the 
term ‘gei-jutsu’, see: Ken’ichi Sasaki, Bigaku Jiten 8th ed. [Dictionary of 
Aesthetics] (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppan Kai, 2004), 31.  
27 Nishi, “Bimyō Gakusetsu” [The Theory of Aesthetics] in Nishi Amane Zenshu 
vol. 1, 477. 
28 Toshihiko and Toyo Izutsu, preface to The Theory of Beauty in the Classical 
Aesthetics of Japan (The Hague; Boston; London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
1981), viv.  
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comparative aesthetics is to put aside a European system of thinking and 
explore systems which are forged from a different perspective. In order to do 
so, it is necessary to re-consider whether it is possible to think about ‘the 
aesthetic’ without recourse to the concept of art and beauty. Consequently, it is 
vital to re-consider what ‘the aesthetic’ itself signifies. This requirement also 
applies when considering aesthetic perception or aesthetic experience. Once the 
concepts of art and beauty are both temporarily excluded from the definition of 
aesthetics, it is necessary to re-define the criteria of ‘the aesthetic’. It would be 
possible, for example, to make a meaningful comparison between Japanese and 
European ceramics, but in order to understand fully the essence of the 
differences between societies, it is necessary to examine the cultural 
foundations underlining their perspectives on cultural phenomena. When the 
process of kanseigaku is considered as aisthetics, we then encounter a 
philosophy of ‘the aesthetic’ in this alternative context – although what we 
have is a re-definition of the Western concept of ‘the aesthetic’ itself. 
Therefore, the perspective of kanseigaku or aisthetics is required when 
comparative aesthetics is thoroughly pursued.  
 
A Methodology of Kansei-gaku Theorised by Eisuke Tsugami 
So far this article has attempted to ground the growing acceptance of aisthetics 
in contemporary Japan by examining the historical development of the term 
kansei and the problem of translating aesthetic terminologies between 
European and Japanese philosophical discourses. This coming section will 
discuss the actual method of aisthetics by examining one of the recent 
outcomes of kanseigaku proposed by Eisuke Tsugami and aisthetics posed by 
Baumgarten.  
Baumgarten’s aesthetics can be seen as aisthetics, given he envisaged it 
as a re-consideration of the concept of aisthesis.29 The recent development of 
aisthetics in Japan has indicated the usefulness of Baumgartens’ work for the 
construction of its methodology. This point is articulated by a theorisation of 
                                                
29 In Baumgarten’s Reflections on Poetry the definition of aesthetics, (“the science 
of perception”) is supplemented with the Greek “aistheta episemes aisthetixes.” 
Thus aesthetics was destined, at least in part, as epistemology of aisthesis its 
foundation. See: Baumgarten, Meditationes Philosophicae de Nonnvllis ad Poema 
[Reflections on Poetry] (Magdeburg: C.H. Hemmerde, 1735), 39; Baumgarten, 
Aesthetica, §1: “Aesthetics (the theory of the liberal arts, the lower study of 
perception, the art of thinking in the fine style, the art of analogical reasoning) is 
the science of perception that is acquire by means of the senses.” The English 
translation is available in Charles Harrison, Paul J. Wood, and Jason Gaiger, Art in 
Theory 1648-1815 (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), 489.  
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aisthetics proposed by aesthetician Eisuke Tsugami. Tsugami’s theorisation of 
aisthetics was triggered by his reconsideration of Baumgarten’s concept of 
‘perfectio’ in his text Aesthetics. Tsugami conceived it to be a ‘completion’ of 
sensory perception. 30  This interpretation differs from the traditional 
understanding of ‘perfectio’ as ‘perfection’: a qualitative property that an 
object possesses. The traditional interpretation is premised on the concept of 
‘perfectio’, which Baumgarten developed in his Meditations on Poetry and 
Metaphysics. In both treatises, he attributed “unity in multiplicity” in an object 
to aesthetic perfection. If more diverse representations are united in a single 
object, it was regarded as more aesthetically perfect, hence more beautiful.31 
His introduction of the concept of “unity in multiplicity” reflects Leibniz.  
Leibniz grounded the sensory perception of perfection as a fusion of parts, or 
unity in multiplicity, and attributed the source of unity to a “pre-established 
harmony”: the rational order that permeates through the universe. The task of 
the rational mind—namely intellect—was then to reveal this natural law as 
much as possible. Baumgarten’s account of aesthetic perfection appears to 
follow this Leibnizian doctrine. A bridge is expected between perfection 
gained through sensory perception and perfection gained through intellectual 
understanding. 
Tsugami has, however, pointed out that this bridge was broken in 
Baumgarten’s Aesthetics. Baumgarten eliminated the concept of “unity in 
multiplicity” from his concept of ‘perfectio’ and instead stated that “the aim of 
aesthetics is the perfection of our sensual cognition as such. This, however, is 
beauty.”32 ‘Perfectio’ is not a description of an object anymore. Rather it 
signifies the perfected state of sensory perception. Tsugami argues that this 
elimination of “unity in multiplicity” and the emphasis on the phrase “sensory 
                                                
30 Contemporary philosopher Steffen W. Gross also translates the Latin ‘perfectio’ 
in Aesthetics into ‘completion’ not ‘perfection’. See: Steffen W. Gross, “The 
Neglected Programme of Aesthetics,” British Journal of Aesthetics 42 (2002): 404. 
31 The number of points that construct a single perception is called “extensive 
clarity” by Baumgarten and distinguished from “intensive clarity,” which leads to 
logical distinctness by means of distinguishability from a different perception. 
Aesthetic perfection only relates to “extensive clarity.” Baumgarten stated as 
follows: “In extensively very clear representations more is represented in a sensate 
way than in those less clear; therefore, they contribute more to the perfection of a 
poem.” See Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, Reflections on Poetry, trans. Karl 
Aschenbrenner and William B. Holther (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 1954), 43. 
32 Baumgarten, Aesthetica, §14. English translation cited from Harrison, Wood, and 
Gaiger, Art in Theory, 489. 
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cognition ‘as such’ (qua talis)” demonstrates Baumgarten’s intention to define 
perception of perfection as completion of sensory perception. That is to say, 
Baumgarten aimed to provide the principles to move beyond the enhancement 
of mere sensory perception to the completion of sensory perception, regardless 
of an intellectual resolution of a representation. In fact, Baumgarten stated that 
the purpose of his aesthetic project lay in the cultivation of sensory perception 
from merely sensory to the level of the ‘beautiful’ within the aesthetic realm. It 
should be noted that Baumgarten considered the relation of ‘things’ (res) and 
‘thinking’ (cogitatio) to form the basis of the cognition of beauty and warned 
his readers not to confuse ‘things’ with materials or objects. 33 Therefore his 
definition of beauty is the completion of a process, not a quality of an object. 
The technique of such cultivation was called ‘art’ (ars). Tsugami’s 
interpretation is further supported by Baumgarten’s claim in Aesthetics that 
perfectio was no longer to be included in the study of aesthetics if the 
perfection was able to be grasped by the rational mind. 34  Through this 
reconceptualisation of ‘perfectio’ in the aesthetic realm, Baumgarten finally 
broke the nexus between the aesthetic realm and the intellectual realm in his 
Aesthetics.  
In support of Tsugami’s focus on the concept of ‘perfectio’, another 
shift from Metaphysics to Aesthetics is also noteworthy. It is the shift from 
Baumgarten’s attention to objective truth to a relational truth between object 
and subject. Given that the “unity in multiplicity” in an object is excluded from 
his conception of aesthetic perception, ‘the aesthetic’ is nothing but the result 
of the interaction between subject and object. In fact, Baumgarten claimed that 
aesthetic phenomena should not be understood as objects or materials, but 
should be understood as the manifestation of a mind.35 Baumgarten accepted 
the subjectivity and relativity of aesthetic experience. What he was after was 
neither purely objective nor subjective, but relational – what he called 
‘representational truth’ (veritas repraesentationis), which is attested only 
intuitively through the completion of sensory perception. 36  Aisthesis in 
aesthetic experience is envisaged as an active faculty to produce intuition 
through an act of representation as a result of interaction between an individual 
subject and an object of thought. It is not a merely receptivity. 
                                                
33 When he defined sensory cognition of beauty in Aesthetica, Baumgarten also 
noted that the relation of ‘things’ (res) and ‘thinking’ (cogitatio) form the basis of 
the cognition of beauty. See Baumgarten, Aesthetica, §18.  
34 Baumgarten, Aesthetica, §16. 
35 Baumgarten, Aesthetica, §§18-20 and §425.  
36 Ibid., §427. 
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Paying heed to the intuitive aspect of aesthetic experience, Tsugami 
developed his own aisthetics.37 Tsugami agrees with Baumgarten in that he 
considered aisthesis to be a subjective, dynamic, and active faculty. This 
conceptualisation is unlike Kantian ‘sensibility’, which signifies universal 
receptivity. Tsugami re-configured the aesthetic experience as a positive 
experience via the Japanese concept of kansei. Furthermore, aisthesis is posited 
as a faculty that is influenced by an individual personality, his or her culture, as 
well as universality. As was mentioned in the second section of this article, 
kansei was thought to be a faculty that determines personal inclination and also 
reflects other multifaceted influences. This feature is different from 
Baumgarten’s concept of aisthesis, which is related yet determined by intellect 
or practical reason. According to Tsugami, the experience of positive values is 
taken to move dynamically from sensory input to the formation of a judgment, 
and is described as intuition based on multifaceted influences such as intellect 
and morality. The dynamics from sensory perception to an intuition of a value 
is called ‘aisthetisation’ (kanseika). Since Tsugami takes subjectivity of 
aisthetisation into consideration, his statement should not be understood to 
mean that aisthetisation as a response to a particular object—whether or not it 
is nature or a work of art—is a universal experience. On the contrary, he 
suggests that aisthetisation may be different depending upon time and space, 
and to be attentive to these differences is a task of aisthetics.  
Based on this understanding, he proposed the method of aisthetics, that 
is, a description of aisthetitisation. This method is developed through his 
investigation of the shift of language. One of the examples he analysed is the 
change in the use of the word ‘nostalgic’. Initially, this term could be used in 
the form of ‘a person gets nostalgic’. Subsequently, the proposition ‘a thing is 
nostalgic’ came to be accepted. In addition to this change, a further 
proposition: ‘a person feels nostalgic’ also emerged. The first shift from ‘I get 
nostalgic’ to ‘I feel nostalgic’ illustrates the way in which a word describing an 
objective situation can morph to a word that indicates a subjective feeling. The 
transition from ‘a person feels nostalgic’ to ‘a thing is nostalgic’ shows that a 
word that describes a quality of feeling can turn into a word that describes a 
qualitative value of object as felt by the speaker. The word ‘nostalgic’ is 
aisthetised by endowing an object with a qualitative value of an object, which 
is intuitively felt. This kind of linguistic shift is traceable by means of 
dictionaries and this is an example of an aisthetisation happening within each 
                                                
37 For the details of Tsugami’s aesthetic theory of kansei, see: Eisuke Tsugami, 
Ajiwai no Kōzō: Kanseika Jidai no Bigaku [The Structure of Taste: Aesthetics in 
the Era of Aisthetisation] (Tokyo: Shunjusha, 2010), 52-59. 
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linguistic area. Tsugami has been reporting the outcomes of this kind of 
linguistic change, which he calls aisthetisation, using this methodology.  
Using Tsugami’s method, aisthetics enables the articulation of a 
particular kind of linguistic change as aesthetic experience, which is 
independent of the concepts of beauty or art. Aesthetic experience can involve 
various words in daily life, which may include the terms that describe non-
beautiful or non-artistic phenomena. It is possible to discuss aesthetics without 
determining the definition of beauty or art. Therefore this methodology is 
useful for investigation into aesthetic phenomena in the non-European cultural 
discourses, where the concepts of beauty or art are not easily translatable. Led 
by Baumgarten’s definition of aesthetic experience and taking the concept of 
‘kansei’ into account, aisthetics thus finds an appropriate locus in the realm of 
aesthetics.  
 
The Method of Aisthetics for Comparative Aesthetics  
It is noteworthy that Tsugami constructed his aisthetics with reference to the 
development of the term ‘kansei’. Examination of the difference between 
kanseigaku as proposed by Tsugami, and Baumgarten’s aisthetics reveals a 
deeper use for aisthetics in the general development of comparative aesthetics. 
This point relates to the philosopher Tanehisa Otabe’s statement that 
comparative aesthetics between Japan and Western Europe is not a 
characterisation of either the purely Western European or purely Japanese 
cultures; rather the outcome of comparative aesthetics has to be considered as 
an interactive production.38 Aesthetic theories devised in non-European regions 
are created from theoretical and practical interests. This thinking arises amidst 
a transcultural dynamism where Japanese perspectives and non-Japanese 
perspectives (in this case Western European perspectives) interact with each 
other. ‘Transcultural’ here means neither a single globalisation nor an 
excessive particularisation of the meaning of ‘the aesthetic’. Its scope should 
be understood along with the concept of Welsch’s understanding of the 
compass of ‘transculturality’: “away from the concentration on the polarity of 
the own and the foreign to an attentiveness for what might be common and 
connective wherever we encounter things foreign.” 39  Aisthetics from a 
                                                
38  See: Tanehisa Otabe, “Tsuzumi Tsuneyoshi to ‘Musuisei’ no Bigaku – 
Kanbunkateki Bigaku no Tameni,” [Tsuzumi Tsuneyoshi and Aesthetics of 
‘Framelessness’ – For the Sake of Intercultural Aesthetics] Bigakugeijutsugaku 
Kenkyu 25 (2007): 195-196. 
39 Wolfgang Welsch, “Transculturality – The Puzzling Form of Cultures Today,” in 
Spaces of Culture: City, Nation, World, ed. Mike Featherstone and Scott Lash 
(London: Sage, 1999), 194-213. 
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transcultural perspective is a continuous act to move beyond the limitation of 
one’s own ‘aisthetic’ paradigm in the face of a different paradigm. This 
recognition permits the creation of another ‘aisthetic’ paradigm through the 
interaction between the two. Through this dynamism, Otabe argues that 
comparative aesthetics may produce perspectives that could be applied to other 
societies and help through analysis to form a different point of view. If 
comparative aesthetics ignores the cultural assumptions behind aesthetic 
theories, aesthetics cannot be free from a tendency to try to distinguish the 
particularities of each culture, which may not exist, or universalise perspectives 
in a single paradigm.  
Taking the view above into consideration, it is possible to think about a 
method of comparative aisthetics that begins with an examination of 
philosophical formulation which enables aisthetics to be utilised as the 
background. That is to say, given that aisthetics originated within a European 
philosophy, comparative aisthetics can begin with investigation into the 
philosophical background of European aisthetics and the articulation of the 
ambit of commonalities with other discourses in order to reveal a further 
potential paradigm of aisthetics in a different philosophical discourse. 
In order to think of the ambit of commonalities, it is necessary to go 
back to the concept of perception in its widest sense. This approach was taken 
by Baumgarten who also began his conceptualisation of aisthesis with an 
attempt to articulate a most fundamental description of perception.40 According 
to Baumgarten, aisthesis is a branch of a perception in its widest sense: a 
primitive type of supraliminal consciousness that is prior to the distinction 
between subjective and objective, or sensory and intellectual. Any thought may 
be the starting point of consideration of aisthetics. This is the broadest kind of 
denominator in aesthetics, which is to be also taken into consideration in terms 
of comparative aisthetics.  
Then, when it is recognised how Baumgarten separates aisthesis from 
any other type of perception, the European philosophical background is 
brought to the fore. There was a dichotomy between noesis (knowledge) and 
aisthesis (perception) and the devaluation of the latter, which had been 
dominant in European philosophy since the Greek era. This devaluation is in 
accord with an attempt to separate human beings who have an ability of noesis 
from other animals who possess aisthesis only. This tendency does not exclude 
the era of Baumgarten. Being a rationalist, Baumgarten’s establishment of 
aesthetics was not a simple matter because there was a Cartesian tradition in 
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the seventeenth century that revived the Platonic devaluation of sensory 
perception.41 Furthermore, at that time there was a tension between the demand 
for the reconciliation of sensationalism and rationalism that took place against 
the background of the tension between German Pietism and the rationalism of 
the Enlightenment. In this context one may observe the tension of the 
dichotomy between noesis and aisthesis. Baumgarten attempted to reconcile 
the two by retaining the dichotomy but elevating the value of aisthesis closer to 
the level of noesis. This dichotomy in itself can be an object of comparative 
aisthesis between European and non-European aesthetic discourses. 
Furthermore, it is also possible to illuminate characteristics of the 
conceptualisation of aisthesis that are particular to rationalism. Baumgarten’s 
concept of aisthesis was expressed in his own terminology as ‘clear’ but 
‘confused’ perception. This terminology is rooted in Descartes’s taxonomy of 
perception—‘clear’, ‘confused’, ‘distinct’, and ‘obscure’—which may be 
traced to Scholastic epistemology.42 Descartes separates himself from the past 
in terms of his prioritisation of perception to already accepted truths. To be 
more specific, according to Descartes, the manner in which a subject perceives 
matters more than what is to be perceived. Priority of perception is also taken 
over by Baumgarten, but what separates the two lies in the classes of 
perception adopted for the acquisition of truth. Descartes’ Principles of 
Philosophy divides the degrees of perception into four modes: distinct 
(distincta) – a possibility of differentiating a perception from another through 
reasoning; clear (clara) – vivid consciousness of a perception; confused 
(confusa) – impossibility of differentiating each perception through reasoning’; 
and obscure (obscura) – impossibility of differentiating a perception from 
other perceptions.43 For Descartes, they are not only mere modal differences, 
but also determinant of truth. Among the four modes of perception, only what 
is perceived clearly and distinctly is considered truth by Descartes. Following 
Descartes’ epistemology, howsoever ‘clear’ a perception may be, it is 
eliminated from the path of truth not because it is not ‘distinct’ but ‘confused’. 
                                                
41 Kai Hammermeister, The German Aesthetic Tradition (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002), 4. 
42 For example, Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus differentiated between ‘distinct’ 
knowledge and ‘confused’ knowledge. For the Scholastic use of these four 
terminologies, see: David Summers, The Judgment of Sense: Renaissance 
Naturalism and the Rise of Aesthetics (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1987), 182-194.  
43 René Descartes, “Principles of Philosophy,” in The Philosophical Writings of 
Descartes vol.1, trans. and ed. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald 
Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 209. 
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Such clear but confused perception was labelled as ‘inferior’ because it was 
conceived to be the source of error. This devaluation is due to his criterion of 
the concept of ‘distinctness’ consisting in demonstrability by means of 
deductive inference. Universal agreement itself is necessary but insufficient for 
the attainment of truth because of its recourse to the connection between 
personal views not interconnection between things perceived.44 According to 
Descartes’ methodology, it was vital to eliminate any pre-judgment for the 
attainment of the firmer truth. If this is the case, emotion can never be the 
source of truth because emotion can never be articulated by deductive 
reasoning and thus remains ‘confused’. A subject can tell which emotion he or 
she possess only through subjective feeling itself, not through articulation by 
means of intellectual reasoning. Emotional perceptions are attributed to 
personal views. On this account alone they cannot be considered ‘distinct’ no 
matter how strongly they are manifested. Thus Cartesian epistemology is 
radically different from the views of Baumgarten who attempted to vindicate 
an epistemic value of ‘clear-confused perception’.  
Nevertheless, even Descartes attempted to elevate a particular type of 
‘emotion’ (commotio) to the level of the ‘distinct’ by separating ‘intellectual 
emotion’ as opposed to ‘animal emotion’.45 In particular, pleasure contrasts 
‘intellectual joy’ (gaudium intellectuale) with ‘animal joy’ (laetitia animalis). 
This only occurred later when he explored morality and the experience of art 
which was later dealt with by Baumgarten as the subject of aesthetics. For 
Baumgarten, practical reason (in contrast to intellectual reason) engaged in 
aesthetic perception, and in this sense moral philosophy and aesthetics were not 
completely separated. Despite this, ‘distinctness’ in emotional perception is 
different from ‘distinctness’ in deductive inference simply because it relies on 
                                                
44 The term ‘interconnection’ is borrowed from the Descartes’ passage: “It must be 
acknowledged that all the sciences are so closely interconnected [omnes inter se 
esse connexas] that it is much easier to learn them all together than to separate one 
from the other. If, therefore, someone seriously wishes to investigate the truth of 
things, he ought not to select one science in particular, for they are all 
interconnected and interdependent.” See: René Descartes, “Rules for the Direction 
of the Mind,” in The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, 10. 
45 The concept of ‘emotion’ expressed as ‘intellectual emotion’ should not be 
confused with other kinds of emotion, which are generally described as ‘passion’. 
As Abel B. Franco interprets, unlike ‘passions’, ‘intellectual emotion’ is thought to 
“occur without the intervention of the body.” See René Descartes, The Passions of 
the Soul, trans. Elizabeth S. Halane and G.R.T. Ross (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1931), 381; Abel B. Franco, “Descartes’ Theory of Passions” 
(PhD diss., University of Pittsburgh, 2006), 70-71. 
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a personal view rather than the demonstrable interconnection between things. 
Thus it still remains in the realm of probability which Descartes strictly 
eliminated in his epistemology elsewhere. There is a tension in Descartes’ 
epistemology between a devaluation of ‘clear-confused perception’ seen in his 
main epistemology and its positive re-evaluation in his conception of 
perception related to morality and art. In other words, in one sense Descartes 
devalued ‘clear-confused perception’, or aisthesis, but on the other hand 
Descartes attempted to re-evaluate it by introducing the concept of ‘intellectual 
emotion’. The latter happened when he explored the issues of morality and art.  
It was Leibniz who explicitly advanced the conceptualisation of 
‘confused’ perception: aisthesis in contrast to ‘distinct’ intellectual perception. 
He conceived ‘confusion’ as an irresolvable complexity of unity and attributed 
the source of this unity to the rational order, which permeates the universe by 
introducing the doctrine of ‘pre-established harmony’. In virtue of the doctrine, 
it was possible for Leibniz to accept the certitude of perception even if it was 
‘confused’ because it was possible to state that the ‘confused’ perception was 
not due to its epistemic value but due to its inability to be self-reflective. The 
question is then how the certainty of knowledge in the ‘confused’ realm was 
vindicated. Regarding this point, Leibniz’ answer was ambivalent. On one 
hand, he believed that the task of philosophy was to reveal the universal law 
behind perception through analysis of the ‘unity in variety’. In this way, he 
created a bridge between ‘confused’ and ‘distinct’ with an expectation to 
render ‘confused’ perception into more ‘distinct’ perception. Nonetheless, he 
also conceded that confused perception might never be explained even by the 
rational mind even if it has a high epistemological value.46 In this case, on an 
experiential level, acquisition of truth is only attributed to pleasure. Such truth, 
as Leibniz claimed, is “…understood a priori by the infinite mind alone, and 
cannot be demonstrated by any resolution.”47 That is to say, there is no 
reflective analysis possible even by the rational mind. It follows that the 
independent truth, which exists only in the realm of ‘clear-confused 
perception’, is still not articulated. Thus, despite his revolutionary 
conceptualisation of ‘confused’, his philosophy did not lend itself to the 
establishment of aesthetics.  
                                                
46 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, “Meditations on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas,” in 
Leibniz Philosophical Papers and Letters, trans. and ed. Leroy E. Lowmker 
(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1956), 291-295. 
47 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, “Necessary and Contingent Truths,” in Leibniz 
Philosophical Writings, ed. G.H.R. Parkinson and trans. Mary Morris and G.H.R. 
Parkinson (London: J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd, 1973), 98. 
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Baumgarten attempted to redeem the value of ‘clear-confused 
perception’, or aisthesis, by offering a priori principles of the completion of 
sensory perception. According to Baumgarten, the cognitive value of aisthesis 
is not at all identical to conceptual truth. He envisaged it as a result of the 
mastery of perception. In other words, it was described as something to be 
pursued rather than something explained. That is why he expressed aesthetic 
truth as ‘light’ or a result of enlightenment. From the perspective of the history 
of aisthetics, an aesthetics, the era of rationalism can be seen as an attempt at 
the redemption of the value of aisthesis through the consideration of morality 
and the experience of art in relation to the realm of aisthesis. This attempt at 
redemption coincides with the priority of perception in terms of the judgment 
of epistemic and moral value. That is to say, when the determiner of truth was 
attributed to perception itself, not the outside authority, it was also then 
necessary to ground the certitude of ‘goodness’ in morality and of art to our 
perceptions. In order to do this, a detailed conceptualisation of ‘clear-confused 
perception’ and its positive re-evaluation was thought to be inevitable. Taking 
the rationalistic tradition into consideration, the background of the 
establishment of aesthetics as the redemption of aisthesis can be interpreted in 
this context. To contrast this understanding with a different background of 
conceptualisation of perception can also form an object of comparison.  
 
Conclusion: The Scope of Aisthetics for Comparative Aesthetics 
Kanseigaku, or aisthetics has been developed over the last couple of decades in 
Japan. It is grounded in both historical and theoretical reasoning. As argued in 
the second section of this article, the term ‘kansei’ was initially a simple 
translation of a European word, but it started possessing a cultural meaning in 
late twentieth century Japan. This change promoted a new philosophical 
reflection on the concept of ‘kansei’. Furthermore, the translation problem that 
was focused on in the third section of this paper illuminates the necessity of 
constructing a different aesthetic theory from artistics or a study of beauty by 
re-considering the meaning of ‘the aesthetic’ itself. Kanseigaku as an aisthetics 
is an attempt to respond to these expectations, taking the development of the 
concept of ‘kansei’ into full consideration. 
As this article has demonstrated, it is important to elucidate a method of 
kanseigaku as an aisthetics in this context. Based on the re-interpretation of 
Baumgarten’s aisthetics and an understanding of the meaning of the word 
‘kansei’, Eisuke Tsugami’s aisthetics provides a way of observing and 
describing aisthetisation, which is not necessarily reducible to “art” or “beauty.” 
Following this viewpoint, aisthetics expands the range of objects that 
comparative aesthetics can deal with. This expansion is especially useful for an 
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investigation of culture that has a different system of thought from European 
discourse. The final section of this article identified a process of comparison 
where a concept of aisthesis is understood within a framework of the history of 
ideas. The broadest denominator of aisthetics can be traced back to the 
perception in the mind itself as Baumgarten posited. This comparison begins 
with exploring how such initial manifestation of the perception may be 
conceived as kansei or aisthesis depending on cultural paradigms. From a 
macro perspective, the dichotomy between aisthesis and noesis, which 
traditionally underlies European philosophy, simply does not exist in a 
Japanese context. The word ‘kansei’ as given in Japanese daily language has a 
different reference point from this European dichotomy. Such a cultural 
difference requires aisthetics to assist in exploring such cross-cultural 
comparisons.   
 
  
